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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:  
THE NEED FOR UNIFORM INTERIM 
MEASURES OF RELIEF 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n recent years, international commercial arbitration has 
experienced a rapid expansion in use.1  Since the post-
World War II era, the arbitration field expanded considerably in 
the context of international trade and commerce.2  The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 tremendously aided arbitra-
tion by leading to a substantial reduction in tariff barriers to 
trade and a resulting increase in the level of international trade 
of goods.4  Increasing international trade led to more disputes 
between states, private companies, businesses, and persons.  
International arbitration institutions flourished, and many ju-
risdictions passed new or updated international arbitration 
statutes.5   
International commercial arbitration has advantages and 
disadvantages when compared to other forms of dispute resolu-
tion.6  Some advantages include neutrality of forum, speed, 
lower cost, informality, enforcement, language, and confidenti-
ality.  Some disadvantages include lack of coercive powers, diffi-
  
 1. For a discussion regarding the increased use of arbitration, see gener-
ally PIETER SANDERS, QUO VADIS ARBITRATION? 9 (1999).  See also Charlotte L. 
Bynum, International Commercial Arbitration, ASIL Guide to Electronic Re-
sources for International Law (Mar. 2001), at http://www.asil.org/resource/ 
arb1.htm. 
 2. See OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 15 (1994).  Also see James E. Meason & Alison G. 
Smith, Non-Lawyers in International Arbitration: Gathering Splinters on the 
Bench, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 24, 26–31 (1991), for a brief overview of in-
ternational trade and its effect on international arbitration. 
 3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (entered into force in Jan. 1, 1948). 
 4. See CHUKWUMERIJE, supra note 2, at 6. 
 5. See generally Clifford Larsen, International Commercial Arbitration, 
ASIL INSIGHT (Apr. 1997), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insight6.htm.  
 6. For a discussion regarding the advantages and disadvantages of arbi-
tration, see SANDERS, supra note 1, at 2–9.  See also RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2000). 
I
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culty with multiparty disputes, and inability to appeal.  Regard-
less of whether arbitration is more advantageous or disadvan-
tageous to international commerce, it is unquestionable that the 
use of international arbitration has grown and is still growing.7 
Arbitration is an attractive alternative to litigation because 
parties choose their own neutral dispute resolution forum.8  
Parties tend to prefer settlement in a neutral forum, rather 
than submitting to the jurisdiction of another party’s home na-
tion.9  In addition, arbitration tends to resolve matters expedi-
tiously because there is no court backlog and parties set their 
own schedules.  However, due to the increase of international 
arbitration and the procedures of selecting forums and arbitra-
tors, the length of time necessary to complete an arbitration has 
also become increasingly long.10  While consideration must be 
given to the fact that the arbitrators have to be paid (whereas 
judges of a court do not), it is not unusual to hear the sugges-
tion that arbitration is cheaper than litigation.11  Finally, par-
ties tend to prefer arbitration because it is typically non-public, 
allowing companies with long-standing relationships to resolve 
their disputes away from public scrutiny.12  Most importantly, 
arbitration is seen as providing the best chance to save the un-
derlying business relationship.13  
However, the system of international arbitration does have 
its drawbacks.  A major disadvantage of arbitration is the arbi-
tral tribunal’s lack of coercive power necessary to support the 
process.14  Such powers might be required to compel discovery, 
the attendance of witnesses, or in the extreme, control over the 
movement of the parties and their assets.  An arbitrator has no 
  
 7. For a general discussion, see Michael Pryles, The Growth of Interna-
tional Arbitration, at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/rwpattach.nsf/viewas 
attachmentPersonal/0417185A03AF31B7CA256C8A00025187/$file/Growth 
INtArb.pdf (last visited June 7, 2003). 
 8. See GARNETT, supra note 6. 
 9. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, 
and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79, 95 
(2000). 
 10. See Larsen, supra note 5. 
 11. See CHUKWUMERIJE, supra note 2, at 8. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See generally, Drahozal, supra note 9. See also Meason, supra note 2. 
 14. See SANDERS, supra note 1.  See also GARNETT, supra note 6, at 15. 
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coercive power over third parties.15  Multiparty disputes are an 
area where the tools of traditional litigation may be more help-
ful than arbitration.16  In many complicated commercial mat-
ters, there may be many interrelated contracts and parties, 
each with the potential for bilateral but related disputes.  In 
this scenario, it may be desirable to hear all the related dis-
putes concurrently; however, the arbitration process depends on 
party autonomy and does not have the liberal joinder rules pre-
sent in litigation.17  Thus, under certain circumstances, litiga-
tion may offer a more practical forum for resolution of claims. 
International arbitration also has other significant discrepan-
cies and dilemmas that need to be resolved.  Another drawback 
of the current state of international arbitration, which will be 
addressed by this Note, is the lack of uniform granting and en-
forcement of interim measures in aid of arbitration. 
This Note will argue that, in order for the system of interna-
tional commercial arbitration to function effectively, a uniform 
procedure for the awarding and enforcement of interim meas-
ures of relief is necessary.  Interim measures are an absolute 
necessity to protect what is at stake in the arbitration.  Regard-
less of whether evidence, real property, personal property, or 
financial assets needs to be preserved, there must be an effec-
tive procedure for maintaining the status quo.  Without the pro-
tection of such provisional remedies, the outcome of the arbitra-
tion could become meaningless to the winning party. 
In Parts I and II, this Note will discuss background informa-
tion concerning international arbitration and provisional reme-
dies, examining in particular the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”) Arbitration Rules,18 the United Nations 
(“UN”) Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) 
Arbitration Rules,19 the UNCITRAL Model Law,20 the American 
  
 15. See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 15. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See ICC Arbitration Rules (1998), reprinted in COMPARISON OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (John J. Kerr, Jr. et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002), 
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp. 
 19. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules (1976), reprinted in COMPARISON OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 18, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts. 
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Arbitration Association (“AAA”) International Arbitration 
Rules21, and the London Court of International Arbitration 
(“LCIA”) Arbitration Rules.22  This Note will also examine the 
UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”),23 the primary en-
forcement tool of international arbitration.  Part III presents 
the legal framework of the system of international arbitration.  
Part IV discusses the problem of interim measures within this 
legal framework.  Part V examines various approaches which 
have been used in attempting to solve this problem, and the 
final section presents recommendations for resolution of the 
dilemma. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Legal Framework for International Arbitration 
1. The Arbitration Agreement 
International arbitration differs from international litigation 
in that arbitrating parties determine to a large extent what 
procedural rules will govern the resolution of their dispute and 
who will decide their dispute.24  The legal basis for arbitration 
lies in an agreement by parties to submit disputes to an arbitral 
tribunal.25  The arbitration agreement defines the issues to be 
addressed by arbitration and the jurisdiction of the tribunal.26  
The arbitration agreement also evidences the consent of the 
  
 20. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, 
(1985), Annex I, available at http://ww.uncitral.org/english/texts (last visited 
May 21, 2003). 
 21. See American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) International Arbitra-
tion Rules, reprinted in COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, 
supra note 18, available at http://www.adr.org. 
 22. See London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) Arbitration 
Rules (1998), reprinted in COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, 
supra note 18, available at http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/download/rules. 
pdf. 
 23. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 30 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) 
[hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 24. See Larsen, supra note 5.  
 25. See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 19. 
 26. Id. 
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parties to arbitrate.  Thus, where a dispute arises between par-
ties who have entered into a contract containing an arbitration 
agreement, the parties, subject to few exceptions, are obligated 
to resolve their disputes according to the agreement.27  The par-
ties must decide whether they wish to refer to and adopt the 
processes of a particular institution, or tailor their own process 
on an ad hoc basis.28  Depending on which form is chosen, par-
ties may use recommended clauses of arbitral institutions.29 
2. Institutional arbitration 
If the parties choose institutional arbitration, they agree to 
submit their dispute to an institution, who will administer the 
arbitration.  Under this system, care must be taken to ensure 
clear and accurate reference to the relevant institution.30  Some 
of the most common institutions include the AAA, ICC, or 
LCIA.  An agreement for institutional arbitration can resolve 
most of the procedural and jurisdictional questions simply 
through reference to the institution and its procedural rules.31 
3. Ad hoc arbitration 
In an ad hoc arbitration, the parties have the freedom to spe-
cifically choose the rules by which their arbitration will be gov-
erned.  If the parties choose ad hoc arbitration, greater care 
needs to be given to identifying various procedural issues.  A 
simpler alternative to trying to design a complete ad hoc proce-
dural system is to designate one of the established procedural 
rule systems.32  One of the more common ad hoc arbitrations is 
one where the parties agree to arbitration by the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, with various modifications.33 
  
 27. Id. 
 28. For a brief discussion of ad hoc versus institutional arbitration, see 
MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 
4 (2001). 
 29. See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 33.  See also Dispute Resolution Services 
Worldwide, About Us, Resolving Commercial Financial Disputes — A Practi-
cal Guide (2003), at http://www.adr.org (including sample arbitration clauses). 
 30. See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 34.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. See Larsen, supra note 5. 
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B. Lex Arbitri 
The lex arbitri, also know as the lex loci arbitri,34 is the law 
governing the arbitration.35  All matters relating to the conduct 
and procedure of the arbitration are subject to this law.36  For 
example, questions of how arbitrators are appointed, how they 
can be challenged, their powers for admission of evidence, and 
what remedies they can award, are all subject to the ultimate 
control of the law of the arbitration.37   
Under the choice of law rules of almost all national legal sys-
tems, the basic rule applied is the “seat theory,”38 that is, the 
law of the arbitration will be the law of the place where the ar-
bitration is situated.  It is also possible that the lex arbitri may 
be a different national law than that governing the substance of 
the parties’ dispute or governing the arbitration agreement.39  In 
international commercial arbitration practice, it is rare for par-
ties specifically to choose the lex arbitri, and the choice of the 
place of arbitration is now recognized as shorthand for the 
method of selection of that law.40 
  
 34. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 28, at 511. 
 35. GARNETT, supra note 6, at 20. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. The “seat theory” is the idea that the lex arbitri, or the law governing 
the arbitration, is based on the law of the nation where the “seat” of the arbi-
tration is, or the state where the arbitration takes place.  See Tatsuya Naka-
mura, The Place of Arbitration in International Arbitration — Its Fictitious 
Nature and Lex Arbitri, 15 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 23 (2000). 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 26. French scholars maintain that French law does not 
take the traditional approach of the “seat theory,” but takes a liberal approach 
of recognizing the freedom of the parties to choose the law applicable to the 
arbitral procedure. 
 40. The trend in recent years has been to substitute the words “place of 
arbitration” for “seat of arbitration.”  See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ¶ 1239, n.94 (1999).  See also YVES 
DERAINS & ERIC SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE NEW ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 
(1998). 
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C. Sources of Law 
1. The UNCITRAL 
Although the UNCITRAL is not an arbitral institution,41 the 
UNCITRAL Rules can be adopted by the parties to an ad hoc or 
institutional arbitration.42  The AAA, the most active arbitral 
institution in the United States (“U.S.”), allows arbitrations to 
be conducted using the UNCITRAL Rules.43 
The UN General Assembly approved the UNCITRAL Rules 
on December 15, 1976.44  The UNCITRAL is not an arbitral in-
stitution because it does not administer arbitration.45  Instead, 
other arbitral institutions have typically agreed to allow parties 
to adopt the UNCITRAL rules for their arbitration instead of 
the institution’s own rules.46  In fact, some institutions have 
adopted the UNCITRAL rules as their own arbitration rules.47  
The UNCITRAL arbitration rules are unique in providing for an 
Appointing Authority (“A.A.”).48  If the parties cannot reach 
agreement on the composition of the arbitral tribunal, the A.A. 
has the final decision-making power.  If the parties fail to agree 
on the A.A.’s identity, then the Secretary General of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration, in The Hague,49 designates the 
A.A.50  Article 26 specifically deals with the granting of interim 
measures of relief. 
The UNICTRAL Model Law (“M.L.”) was another achieve-
ment of the UNCITRAL in the field of arbitration.  On June 21, 
  
 41. See PIETER SANDERS, THE WORK OF UNCITRAL ON ARBITRATION AND 
CONCILIATION (2001). 
 42. See Larsen, supra note 5. 
 43. See SANDERS, supra note 37, at 1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. For example, the AAA commonly allows arbitrations to be adminis-
tered under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
 47. See SANDERS, supra note 41, at 1. 
 48. The Appointing Authority is a neutral party who may decide issues 
dealing with the arbitration if the parties are unable to reach agreement on 
these matters.  See SANDERS, supra note 41. 
 49. See http://www.pca-cpa.org for more information on the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 
 50. See SANDERS, supra note 41, at 1. 
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1985, the Commission adopted the text of the M.L.51  The Gen-
eral Assembly approved the M.L. on December 11, 1985,52 and 
requested the transmittal of the text to member states and arbi-
tral institutions together with the travaux preparatoires.53  To-
day, forty-seven individual jurisdictions from all parts of the 
world have adopted the M.L.54  Some countries have adopted the 
M.L. as both their domestic arbitration law and their interna-
tional arbitration law, while others prefer two separate regimes 
of law.55  Even countries that have not adopted the M.L. have 
clearly taken the M.L. into account, as evidenced by the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996.56  M.L. Articles 9 and 17 govern interim 
measures of relief. 
2. The International Chamber of Commerce 
The oldest and perhaps best-known arbitral institution is the 
ICC.  Located in Paris, the ICC also has its own separate set of 
rules for arbitration.57  The ICC does not actually “decide” arbi-
trations but rather administers the arbitration, helping to se-
lect arbitrators, receiving and distributing pleadings, and re-
viewing awards for technical accuracy.58 
The ICC founded the International Court of Arbitration (“ICC 
Court”) in 1923, in order to place at the disposal of business an 
international organization capable of settling international 
  
 51. See PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS (2000). 
 52. G.A. Res. 72, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess. (1985), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r072.htm. 
 53. The travaux preparatoires are analytical commentaries by the 
UNCITRAL’s Secretary-General and the Report of the Commission. See 
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm for a comprehensive list of the various 
travaux preparatoires available by the UNCITRAL. 
 54. See BINDER, supra note 51, at 8.  For a comprehensive list of all forty-
seven jurisdictions who have adopted the UNCITRAL M.L. in whole or part, 
see id. at 9-10. 
 55. See SANDERS, supra note 41, at 23.  For a brief description regarding 
the different types of adoption of the M.L., see BINDER, supra note 51, at 11. 
 56. For a general discussion of how the English Arbitration Act of 1996 
takes into account the UNCITRAL M.L., see William W. Park, The New Eng-
lish Arbitration Act, 13 No. 6 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. (1998). 
 57. See DERAINS, supra note 37. 
 58. For a description of the role the ICC plays in arbitration, see W. 
LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 
(3d ed. 2000). 
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commercial disputes without recourse to formal legal proce-
dure.59  The ICC Court has administered nearly 10,000 interna-
tional arbitration cases and has become widely known as the 
leading institution for arbitration of international commercial 
disputes.60  The ICC Court, unique in its composition and role, 
monitors all ICC arbitral proceedings.61  Its many functions in-
clude: whether or not to accept an arbitration; whether to per-
mit joinder of arbitration; designating arbitrators; confirming 
the appointment of arbitrators; and most notably, reviewing of 
arbitrators’ awards.62 
The ICC Arbitration Rules (“ICC Rules”) are commonly said 
to have as one of their fundamental characteristics a “univer-
sal” character, meaning they are intended for use in any coun-
try, under any law, and in accordance with any system of legal 
procedure.63  The ICC Rules are generally accepted as flexible 
and autonomous, however, there is also a high degree of institu-
tional involvement in the supervision of the arbitral process.64 
The ICC also has other formal dispute resolution mecha-
nisms.  Through its National Committees,65 the ICC endeavors 
to uphold the ultimate quality and efficacy of the arbitral proc-
ess.66  The National Committees appoint members to the ICC 
Court, assist in selection of arbitrators, and can be of assistance 
in obtaining voluntary compliance with an award by a recalci-
trant party.67 
In 1995, the ICC Commission of International Arbitration 
(“Commission”)68 appointed a Working Party69 to make proposals 
  
 59. See DERAINS, supra note 40. 
 60. Id. at 1. 
 61. See http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/intro_court/introduction.asp, 
for a general description of the court and its role. 
 62. See DERAINS, supra note 40, at 3. 
 63. Id. at 3. 
 64. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 28. 
 65. The National Committees and groups ensure that the ICC takes ac-
count of their national business concerns in its policy recommendations to 
governments and international organizations.  For an overview of ICC proce-
dure, see generally ICC, How the ICC Works, http://www.iccwbo.org/home/ 
intro_icc/how_works.asp (last visited June 7, 2003) 
 66. See DERAINS, supra note 40, at 3. 
 67. Id. at 4. 
 68. The ICC Commission was formed to examine the Arbitration Rules and 
make determinations about what changes were necessary. 
 69. The Working Party suggested general changes to the ICC Rules. 
File: WANG Base Macro Final.doc Created on:  6/21/2003 12:42 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:25 PM 
1068 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
to the Commission concerning the possible need for rule 
changes.  A major issue addressed by the group was the need 
for clarification over the availability of interim measures.70  The 
Working Party reported to the Commission that it proposed to 
undertake a general examination of the ICC Rules with a view 
to suggesting revisions that would assist practitioners, since 
many changes to a well-known body of rules, such as the ICC 
Rules, should not be made too frequently.71  The Working 
Party’s changes did not fundamentally alter the ICC system of 
Arbitration.72  However, the rules governing interim measures 
of relief were changed.  The former Rules did not explicitly state 
whether ICC arbitrators could grant interim measures of re-
lief.73  This was a great source of uncertainty.  The revised ICC 
Rules, through Article 23, makes clear that arbitrators possess 
the power to grant interim remedies. 
3. The AAA 
The AAA is another institution available to resolve a wide 
range of disputes through arbitration.74  Founded in 1926, the 
AAA is an independent, non-profit organization headquartered 
in New York with regional offices throughout the U.S.75  The 
AAA holds lists of arbitrators, and international arbitrations 
are regulated by the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules.76  The 
AAA amended their version of arbitration rules, rendered effec-
tive September 1, 2000.77  The rules are intended to provide ef-
  
 70. See DERAINS, supra note 53, at 7. 
 71. Id. Changes to a well known body of rules should not be made too often 
because it harms the stability of the institution’s rules and makes it seem 
more arbitrary, like they can be changed at will. 
 72. For a description of the various changes made by the 1998 Rules, see 
Filip De Ly, The 1998 ICC Arbitration Rules, 1 INT. A.L.R. 1998, at 220–31.  
See also W. LAURENCE CRAIG, ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE 1998 ICC ARBITRATION 
RULES (1998). 
 73. See GUIDE TO ICC ARBITRATION, ICC Publication No. 448(E) (1994), for 
a set of the ICC Arbitration Rules prior to the 1998 amendments. 
 74. See AAA, About Us, A Brief Overview of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation (2003), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15765. 
 75. See PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
(Alex Bosch ed., 1994). 
 76. Id. at 10 
 77. AAA International Arbitration Rules, supra note 21. 
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fective arbitration services to world business, through the use of 
administered arbitration.78 
4. The LCIA 
The LCIA is a very popular European international arbitral 
forum.79  The institution is comprised of the Chamber of Com-
merce, the Corporation of the City of London, and the Institute 
of Arbitrators.80  The procedure for interim measures is regu-
lated by the LCIA International Arbitration Rules, as revised 
on January 1, 1985.81  As with ICC and AAA arbitration, the 
LCA Court is responsible for the organization and administra-
tion of the procedure and in particular for the appointment of 
the arbitrators.82 
D. Enforcement 
1. The New York Convention 
The New York Convention83 is the most important enforce-
ment treaty in international arbitration.84  The treaty binds na-
tions to recognize and enforce arbitral awards from foreign ju-
risdictions.85  The New York Convention was a substantial im-
provement upon the Geneva Convention of 1927, since it pro-
vided a simple and effective method of obtaining recognition 
and enforcement of foreign awards.86  The New York Convention 
has been described as “the single most important pillar on 
which the edifice of international arbitration rests”87 and as a 
convention which, perhaps could lay claim to be the most effec-
tive instance of international legislation in the entire history of 
  
 78. See supra Part I. 
 79. See LCIA, Arbitration; Rule, Clauses & Costs, at http://www.lcia-
arbitration.com/arb/ (last visited June, 7 2003), for an overview of the LCIA 
and arbitration. 
 80. Id. 
 81. LCIA Arbitration Rules, supra note 22. 
 82. Id. 
 83. New York Convention, supra note 23. 
 84. See Larsen, supra note 5. 
 85. See New York Convention, supra note 23, at pmbl. 
 86. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 455 (1999). 
 87. J. Gillis Wetter, The Present Status of the International Court of Arbi-
tration of the ICC: An Appraisal, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 91 (1990). 
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commercial law.88  The New York Convention established a new 
legal regime favoring international arbitration through the fa-
cilitation of recognition and enforcement of arbitral agreements 
and awards.89 
As of January 1, 2001, 127 states were parties to the New 
York Convention.90  The goal of the New York Convention is to 
facilitate the recognition and enforcement of both agreements to 
arbitrate91 and arbitral awards.92  Although the convention gen-
erally provides that arbitral awards made in any foreign state 
are to be recognized and enforced,93 it specifically allows ratifi-
cation with reservations limiting recognition and enforcement 
to awards made in the territory of another contracting state 
(the “reciprocity” reservation), and awards considered “commer-
cial” under the national law of the Contracting State.94  The U.S. 
included both reservations in its ratification.95  Along with the 
Federal Arbitration Act,96 the New York Convention is a critical 
source of law for international arbitration in the U.S. 
As long as there is a written agreement to arbitrate, courts of 
contracting states are required to enforce that agreement by 
referring the parties to arbitration, “unless it finds that the said 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.”97 Recognition and enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement or award may only be refused upon limited grounds.  
The New York Convention identifies five grounds on which rec-
ognition and enforcement of a Convention award may be re-
fused at the request of the party against whom it is invoked.98  If 
  
 88. Lord Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 43 
(1989). 
 89. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 679–81. 
 90. See United States Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/ 
ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/part1/chapterXII/treaty1.asp (last vis-
ited June 7, 2003), for a comprehensive list of the 24 signatory states and the 
127 states which are parties to the treaty. 
 91. New York Convention, supra note 23, art. II 
 92. Id. art. III 
 93. Id. art. I(1). 
 94. Id. art. I(3). 
 95. See Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213 (1997). 
 96. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947). 
 97. New York Convention, supra note 23, art. II(3). 
 98. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 86, at 459. 
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the opposing party can prove: (1) the incapacity of the parties or 
invalidity of the arbitration agreement; (2) improper notice or 
other lack of due process; (3) an award beyond the scope of the 
agreement to arbitrate; (4) improper arbitral procedure or com-
position of the arbitral board; or (5) that the award has been set 
aside or suspended or is otherwise not binding, then recognition 
or enforcement may be refused.99  In addition, Article V(2) of the 
Convention provides that recognition or enforcement may be 
refused if the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of set-
tlement by arbitration under the enforcing state’s laws or if rec-
ognition or enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of 
that state.100 
2. The Role of National Courts 
In an address to an international arbitration conference, Lord 
Mustill compared the relationship between the courts and arbi-
trators to a relay race:   
Ideally, the handling of arbitrable disputes should resemble a 
relay race.  In the initial stages, before arbitrators are seized 
of the dispute, the baton is in the grasp of the court: for at that 
stage there is no other organization which could take steps to 
prevent the arbitration agreement from being ineffectual.  
When the arbitrators take charge they take over the baton and 
retain it until they have made an award.  At this point, having 
no longer a function to fulfill, the arbitrators hand back the 
baton so that the court can in case of need lend its coercive 
powers to the enforcement of the award.101 
In principle, the relationship between the public world of the 
courts and the private world of arbitration should not give rise 
to any significant conflict.102  At the beginning of the arbitral 
process, both under domestic legislation and under interna-
tional treaties, such as the New York Convention, it is the 
courts — and not the arbitrators — who must enforce the agree-
  
 99. New York Convention, supra note 23, art. V(1). 
 100. Id. art. V(2). 
 101. Lord Mustill, Comments and Conclusions, in CONSERVATORY & 
PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 9th Joint Colloquium 
(ICC Publication 1993) [hereinafter CONSERVATORY MEASURES]. 
 102. Id. 
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agreement to arbitrate.103  Again, at the end of the process, it is 
the courts that must enforce the arbitral award.104  Thus, al-
though parties tend to agree to arbitration in an effort to avoid 
courts, the court system plays an essential role in the frame-
work of arbitration. 
III. INTERIM MEASURES UNDER THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK — 
PROBLEMS 
A. Various Types of Interim Measures 
In arbitral proceedings, the need often arises for provisional 
remedies or other interim measures of relief.  These measures 
are often needed because, in reality, arbitral proceedings are no 
less adversarial than litigation in public courts.  The idea that 
provisional remedies are unnecessary or inadequate in arbitral 
proceedings is to confuse arbitration with conciliation.105  These 
interim measures take on different forms and are often called 
different names.  In the UNCITRAL M.L. and UNCITRAL 
Rules, they are called “interim measures of protection.”106  In the 
English version of the ICC Rules, they are known as “interim or 
conservatory measures,”107 in the French version as “mesures 
provisoires ou conservatoires,”108 and in the Swiss law governing 
international arbitration they are referred to as “provisional or 
protective measures.”109 
  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Conciliation is an informal process designed to create an environment 
where negotiations take place.  Arbitration, on the other hand, is a form of 
private adjudication where a mutually acceptable third party hears argu-
ments from either side in a dispute and renders a judgment.  The judgment, 
known as an award, is confidential and binding.  For a discussion regarding 
conciliation and its differences with arbitration, see JEROLD S. AUERBACH, 
JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS 96–97 (1983). 
 106. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 86, at 345–46. 
 107. ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note 18, art. 23. 
 108. French Code of Civil Procedure Code (Noveau code de procedure civile), 
Book IV, Arbitration, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION, Annex I (Jan Paullson ed., 2002). 
 109. Swiss Private International Law Act, 1987, c. 12, art. 183, reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Annex II (Jan Paull-
son ed., 2002). 
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Provisional remedies and interim relief come in many forms, 
depending on the parties involved and context of the dispute.  
However, most often these remedies entail either the seizure of 
property, often called attachments or holding orders, or interim 
orders, also known as injunctions.110  In attachment proceedings, 
the intention of the petitioner is to preserve the assets repre-
senting the subject matter or being necessary for enforcement of 
the arbitration award.111  These orders are designed to prevent 
dissipation of the property or to preserve the condition of the 
property for future inspection.112  Alternatively, a litigant may 
be ordered to deposit property into the custody of a third 
party.113   
Another type of interim measure is an order to preserve the 
status quo between the parties pending the resolution of the 
merits of their dispute.  For example, a party may be ordered 
not to take certain steps, such as terminating an agreement, 
disclosing trade secrets, or using disputed intellectual property 
or other rights, pending a decision on the merits.114   In the in-
terest of preserving the status quo, ICC tribunals have been 
willing to order a contract to be performed for a limited period, 
even though one party claims that the contract was rescinded.115  
The provisional relief of preserving the status quo can be pro-
vided either by the arbitrator or by the public courts, during the 
course of, and in conjunction with, the arbitral proceedings.116  
Issues often arise as to whether arbitral tribunals or national 
courts have the power to order such relief.117  The arbitral tribu-
  
 110. For a discussion regarding the differences between holding measures 
and interlocutory injunctions in international arbitration, see RUBINO-
SAMMARTANO, supra note 28, at 631–33. 
 111. See Bosch, supra note 75, at 4-5. 
 112. See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 920 (2001). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 921. 
 115. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 463.  In ICC Arbitration Case 
6503/1990, 1995 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1022, the arbitral tribunal 
ordered that a long term contract should remain in existence, and the parties 
should exercise its terms during a period of one year after the claimed date of 
rescission, to permit the arbitral tribunal to rule on the merits of the claimed 
rescission and to avoid unnecessary damage.  
 116. See Bosch, supra note 75, at 4. 
 117. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 86, at 354. 
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nal must look to the set of arbitration rules under which it is 
operating to determine if such jurisdiction is granted.118  The 
courts, on the other hand, may have the power to act, but must 
determine whether it would be appropriate to do so.119 
Parties may also seek orders requiring adverse parties to post 
security for satisfying the final judgment in the case.120  Orders 
for security may be for either the amount in dispute in the un-
derlying controversy or for the fees of legal representation and 
other costs to be incurred in resolving the dispute.121  In ICC 
arbitration, security for costs is usually not granted, neverthe-
less, the power exists and in some circumstances may be justi-
fied.122  Other interim measures of relief may include: orders for 
payment of part of the claim, orders to comply with the arbitra-
tion rules, orders to a party to act or omit, or orders and rec-
ommendations of holding measures.123 
Interim measures are incredibly controversial in interna-
tional arbitration because of the inherent risks involved in 
granting such orders.  First, there is a risk that the issuance of 
an interim order will represent factual victory in the main pro-
ceeding for the petitioner.124  Even though the decision is only 
interlocutory, its consequences can often be irreparable.  Addi-
tionally, there is a risk that the petitioner is being abusive in its 
use of the request for an interim order.  Parties often do not use 
proceedings for provisional remedies solely to secure later en-
forcement of an award, but in reality use a petition for an in-
  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  The famous English case of Channel Tunnel Group Limited v. Bal-
four Beatty Construction Limited, [1993] A.C. 334 (Lord Mustill), XIX ICCA 
Y.B. COMM. ARB. 736 (1994), is an example of a case where a national court 
dealt with the issue of whether to grant an injunction to preserve the status 
quo.  The case went on appeal to the court of first instance to the Court of 
Appeal, and then to the highest English court, the House of Lords.  Each court 
gave a different answer to the question posed.  For a discussion of the Chan-
nel Tunnel case, see Claude Reymond, The Channel Tunnel Case and the Law 
of International Arbitration, 109 LAW Q. REV. 337, 341 (1993). 
 120. See BORN, supra note 112, at 921. 
 121. See, e.g., Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 689 
F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 122. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 469.  For a discussion of how the 
ICC address security for costs issues, see id. at 467–69.  
 123. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 28, at 631–32.  
 124. See Bosch, supra note 75, at 4. 
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terim order as an offensive weapon.125  The interim order can be 
used to exert pressure on the opponent by threatening the sei-
zure of its assets abroad.126  Moreover, interim proceedings may 
also be used as dilatory tactics to stay the general progress of 
the arbitration.127  Thus, the proper determination of the issue of 
interim measures of relief is critical to any successful interna-
tional arbitration. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL RULES AND INTERIM MEASURES 
A. Generally 
While the different sets of rules of each arbitral institution 
are fairly similar, the problem of interim measures of protection 
is not effectively addressed by any of the various institutional 
rules.  Although arbitration rules may provide for the issuance 
of interim measures of relief, there has been no uniform prac-
tice among arbitral tribunals in granting or denying such re-
lief.128  Instead, some arbitral tribunals grant interim measures, 
others explicitly do not, and some tribunals direct parties to 
national courts for resolution of interim awards.129  Tribunals 
refer parties to courts because arbitral tribunals possess no co-
ercive power for enforcement of their interim orders, and be-
cause provisional remedies can only be properly enforced 
through the court system.130  Although interim measures can be 
coercively enforced through the courts, presenting arbitral or-
ders to courts is often problematic. 
B. The UNCITRAL 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules contain a single provision 
that expressly permits arbitral tribunals, as well as courts, to 
order interim measures of protection.131  While the UNCITRAL 
  
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Larsen, supra note 5. 
 129. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 28.  
 130. See Bosch, supra note 75.  
 131. UNCITRAL, Article 26(1) states:  
At the request of either party, the arbitral tribunal may take interim 
measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject matter of the 
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Rules allow for both direct arbitral award of interim relief as 
well as court awarded relief, the Rules provide no guidance as 
to the enforcement of measures.132  The Rules provide no coer-
cive power to the arbitral tribunal for enforcement of any in-
terim measures of relief.133 
C. The ICC 
The ICC Rules also do not effectively address the problem.  
The ICC Rules were amended in 1998 to add that, “at the re-
quest of a party, [the tribunal should] order interim or conser-
vatory measures it deems appropriate.”134  While this provision 
permits the arbitral tribunal to grant interim measures, the 
ICC Rules possess no enforcement mechanism.  Although par-
ties may be reluctant to disregard arbitral tribunal decisions, 
the ICC Rules do not provide for sanctions against parties who 
remain recalcitrant and do not follow such orders.135 
D. The AAA 
Section 22 of the AAA International Arbitration Rules (“AAA 
Rules”)136 allows arbitral tribunals to grant interim measures.137  
Parties to an arbitration agreement are also entitled to request 
provisional relief from public courts.138  This entitlement comes 
  
dispute, including measures for the conservation of goods forming the 
subject matter in the dispute, such as ordering their deposit with a 
third person or the sale of perishable goods. 
 132. See BINDER, supra note 51 
 133. Id. 
 134. DERAINS, supra note 40, at 274. 
 135. Id. 
 136. AAA International Arbitration Rules, supra note 21, § 22.   
At the request of any party, the tribunal may take whatever interim 
measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject matter of the 
dispute, including measures for the conservation of the goods which 
are the subject matter in dispute, such as ordering their deposit with 
a third person or the sale of perishable goods. 
Id. 
 137. Rule 34 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules states: “[t]he arbi-
trator may issue such orders for interim relief as may be deemed necessary to 
safeguard the property that is the subject matter of the arbitration without 
prejudice to the rights of the parties or to the final determination of the dis-
pute.” 
 138. See Bosch, supra note 75, at 10. 
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from Rule 34 and Section 22(3).139  Pursuant to Section 22(3) of 
the AAA Rules, court proceedings seeking provisional relief will 
never constitute a waiver of the underlying arbitration proceed-
ings.140   
E. The LCIA 
In LCIA arbitration, the arbitrator can order the preserva-
tion, storage, or sale or other disposal of any property or thing 
under the control of any of the parties.141  In addition, the par-
ties in LCIA arbitration are free to request pre-award conserva-
tory measures from a competent public court.142  The LCIA 
Rules grant arbitrators authority to order a party to provide 
“security for legal or other costs,” and “upon such terms as the 
Arbitral Tribunal considers appropriate,” including the provi-
sion of a cross-indemnity.143  Arbitrators may order sanctions 
against a party that fails to comply with an order to provide 
security, by staying or dismissing that party’s claims or coun-
terclaims in an award.144  Another provision indicates that the 
arbitral tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to order security for 
legal and other costs.145 
F. International Arbitration Treaties 
 
In addition to consulting the arbitration agreement, various 
institutional arbitration rules, and any applicable national 
laws, parties must also take into account any applicable inter-
  
 139. Id.  Section 22(3) provides: “[a] request for interim measures addressed 
by a party to a judicial authority shall not be deemed incompatible with the 
agreement to arbitrate or a waiver of the right to arbitrate.” 
 140. Id. 
 141. See LCIA Rules, supra note 22, art. 13.1. 
 142. See Bosch, supra note 75, at 11–12.  Article 15.4 of the LCIA Rules 
provides that, “[w]ithout prejudice to the right of any party to apply to a com-
petent court for pre-award conservatory measures (except those referred to in 
Art 15.), the tribunal shall also have the power to order any party to provide 
security for all or part of any amount in dispute in the arbitration.”  LCIA 
Rules, supra note 22, art. 15.4.  
 143. See Gregoire Marchac, Interim Measures in International Commercial 
Arbitration under the ICC, AAA, LCIA, and UNCITRAL Rules, 10 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 123, 125 (1999). 
 144. Id. at 129 
 145. Id. at 130. 
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national arbitration conventions or treaties.146  Unlike the insti-
tutional arbitration rules previously set forth, the New York 
Convention has no provision expressly referring to awards of 
provisional measures by arbitrators.147  While the 1961 Euro-
pean Convention148 provides that “[a] request for interim meas-
ures or measures of conservation addressed to a judicial author-
ity shall not be deemed incompatible with the arbitration 
agreement, or regarded as a submission of the substance of the 
case to the court,”149 the New York Convention is silent as to 
interim measures.  In fact, some U.S. courts have interpreted 
Article II(3)150 of the New York Convention to preclude courts 
from granting pre-award attachments based upon the intent of 
the New York Convention to prevent significant judicial inter-
vention until after an arbitration award is made.151  However, 
there is also the sentiment, based on Article VI(1)(e),152 that the 
New York Convention has a permissive attitude toward court 
enforcement of provisional remedies in arbitration.153  In the 
  
 146. See BORN, supra note 112, at 921. 
 147. Id. at 922. 
 148. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 484 
U.N.T.S. 364 (1963) [hereinafter EC]. 
 149. See id. art. VI(4). 
 150. The EC, Article II(3) provides: 
The court of a contracting State, when seized on an action in a matter 
in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the 
meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, re-
fer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that said agreement is 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.  
Id. art. II(3). 
 151. See McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 
1974); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane S.A., 456 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1982).  But 
see, Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
 152. EC Article VI(1)(e) provides: 
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has 
been made to a competent authority referred to in article V(1)(e), the 
authority before which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if 
it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the 
award and may also, on application of the party claiming enforcement 
of the award, order the other party to give suitable security.   
EC, supra note 148, art. VI(1)(e). 
 153. See Bernado M. Cremades, Is Exclusion of Concurrent Courts’ Jurisdic-
tion over Conservatory Measures to be Introduced through a Revision of the 
Convention?, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 105 (1989).  
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absence of uniform provisions on this issue in the New York 
Convention, each country must determine whether, and under 
what conditions, such measures can be taken by its own 
courts.154 
G. Specific Difficulties in Granting Interim Measures in Arbitra-
tion 
The contractual nature of arbitration gives rise to several 
unique difficulties.  First, a common difficulty in arbitration 
occurs when resolution of the dispute involves a third party.155  
Issues often arise when interim measures are needed in the 
form of orders that have an effect on those who are not party to 
the agreement to arbitrate.  Moreover, when a third party wit-
ness’ testimony is needed, there are few legal or practical means 
for the arbitrators to compel such testimony.156  Secondly, when 
interim measures of protection are needed against one of the 
parties to the arbitration, issues arise as to the availability of 
such remedies when they are sought at early stages in an arbi-
tral proceeding.157 
Generally, the arbitral tribunal, if it is empowered by the re-
spective governing rules, only has the power to grant interim 
measures of relief to the parties who are subject to the arbitra-
tion.  In other words, one significant problem of international 
arbitration is that a third party, who may possess necessary 
information or vital assets, cannot be subject to interim meas-
ures because that third party has not agreed to be bound by the 
arbitration.  For example, in Lance Paul Larsen v. Kingdom of 
  
 154. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 86, at 712–13.  For arguments for 
and against revision of the New York Convention, see Cremades, supra note 
153 (arguing for further development of international arbitration law and no 
revision of the convention), and V.V. Veeder, Provisional and Conservatory 
Measures, in ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK 
CONVENTION, EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 22 (1999) (arguing for a supplemen-
tal convention, to allow enforcement of interim measures). 
 155. See Bernardini, The Powers of the Arbitrator, in CONSERVATORY 
MEASURES, supra note 101, at 21. 
 156. See Lawrence W. Newman, International Arbitration Unfinished Busi-
ness, 225 N.Y. L.J., Apr. 3, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Newman I]. 
 157. See Lawrence W. Newman and Michael Burrows, Provisional Remedies 
in Aid of Arbitration, 212 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Newman 
II]. 
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Hawaii,158 an arbitration conducted by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, the tribunal decided that the basis of the dispute 
was the treatment of the plaintiff by the U.S.159  Moreover, the 
tribunal noted that the respondent requested interim measures 
of protection against the U.S.160  The tribunal explicitly stated 
that it lacked jurisdiction to award interim measures against 
non-parties.161  Therefore, one of the apparent difficulties of in-
terim measures in the international arbitration context is the 
inability to apply these types of measures to third parties. 
Parties to arbitration also face difficulties when one party 
seeks interim relief at an early stage of the proceeding.  In arbi-
tration, it is typically difficult to obtain such relief expedi-
tiously, because the arbitral tribunal has not yet been consti-
tuted.162  As a result, a party in need of provisional relief can 
obtain it only in the regular courts.  If a party seeks to delay the 
opposing party’s request for an injunction or attachment, that 
party can slow the process considerably by taking a long time to 
select an arbitrator.  There are times when parties need imme-
diate recourse, i.e., to enjoin an imminent action, and the arbi-
tration procedure simply does not accommodate this need.  
Thus, most parties in need of this immediate assistance seek 
the aid of national courts for this emergency relief.163  However, 
as the parties go to court, they encounter another different 
realm of problems with court issuing interim measures. 
When parties seek interim relief in national courts, they are 
confronted with several difficult issues.  First, some U.S. courts 
have ruled that provisional relief is not available from a court 
  
 158. Lance Paul Larsen v. Kingdom of Hawaii, PCA Arbitration, available 
at http://pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/#Larsen. 
 159. See Award, Lance Paul Larsen v. Kingdom of Hawaii, Procedural Or-
der 6.2(10), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/LHKAward.pdf. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at Procedural Order 3. 
 162. See Newman I, supra note 156. 
 163. See Richard Allan Horning, Interim Measures of Protection; Security for 
Claims and Costs; and Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (In 
Toto), 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 155 (1998).  The need for emergency relief is par-
ticularly pervasive in the context of intellectual property and technology law.  
In the world of intellectual property, speed is God, and when dealing with 
infringing patent, copyright, or intellectual property rights, emergency relief 
is especially needed because the infringement is hard to detect and difficult to 
quantify in monetary terms.  See id. 
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when the parties have provided for arbitration.164  Secondly, 
courts that do provide provisional relief in such cases have 
ruled that a party that seeks relief in court waives its right to 
arbitrate.165  Furthermore, the losing party in a motion before a 
court may have a right to appeal, and through appeal may slow 
the arbitration process considerably.166  Thus, the difficulty 
posed by the need for interim relief in the early stage of the ar-
bitration is not resolved by recourse to courts.  Instead, recourse 
to courts tends to cause, rather than resolve, problems for the 
parties to the arbitration. 
H. The Problem in the U.S. 
Currently, the different institutional rules, national arbitra-
tion laws, and judicial precedents, are varied and in disarray.  
The state of international arbitration in the U.S. is a typical 
example of the perplexing nature of the law.  Federal courts 
disagree over the effect of the New York Convention on the au-
thority of national courts to grant provisional relief in aid of 
international arbitration.  McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
CEAT, Spa167 is the seminal decision holding that Article II(3) of 
the New York Convention forbids court-ordered provisional re-
lief in aid of arbitration.  In short, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, in McCreary, concluded that McCreary’s judi-
cial action for provisional relief was in fact designed to frustrate 
the arbitral process that it had agreed to and, therefore, the 
New York Convention precluded the suit and the request for 
attachment.168  The plain language of McCreary is that Article 
II(3) divests a national court of jurisdiction to order attachment 
in aid of arbitration, or to do anything else other than to compel 
arbitration.  As the McCreary court stated, “the purpose of the 
[New York] Convention will be best carried out by restricting 
pre-arbitration judicial action to determining whether arbitra-
tion should be compelled.”169  Some state courts have also fol-
  
 164. See McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 
1974). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Garnett, supra note 6, at 15. 
 167. McCreary Tire, 501 F.2d 1032. 
 168. See BORN, supra note 112, at 937. 
 169. McCreary Tire, 501 F.2d 1032. 
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lowed the McCreary rationale.  In Cooper v. Ateliers de la Moto-
becane, S.A.,170 the New York State Court of Appeals interpreted 
the New York Convention, as purportedly requiring courts 
“seized of” matters that are the subject to agreements to arbi-
trate to refer the matter to arbitration without addressing the 
substance of those matters.  In fact, a number of lower federal 
courts have also followed the McCreary rationale.171 
On the other hand, a number of cases have rejected the ra-
tionale of McCreary and held that Article II(3) permits court-
ordered attachments in aid of international arbitration.  In 
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex,172 a federal district court 
suggested that coercive remedies and other court-ordered inter-
vention available only through courts may often facilitate the 
arbitration process rather than denigrate it.  Thus, the court 
held that resort to courts for interim measures is not necessar-
ily inconsistent with the reference of the merits of the dispute to 
arbitration.173  In addition, the court held that “nothing in the 
text of the [New York] Convention itself suggests that it pre-
cludes pre-judgment attachment.”174  The weight of lower U.S. 
court authority has followed Carolina Power and rejected the 
premise that Article II(3) flatly forbids all court-ordered provi-
sional measures in aid of arbitration.175  However, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has not ruled on the issue. 
  
 170. Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408 (1982). 
 171. A number of lower courts have followed the holding of McCreary in 
holding that Article II(3) of the Convention prohibits national courts from ever 
ordering attachments in aid of an international arbitration that is subject to 
the Convention.  See I.A.T.D. Assoc. Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 
1981); Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangan Minjakdangas 
Bumi Nasional, 427 F.Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (attachment); Drexel Burnham 
Labert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 139 A.D.2d 323 (1st Dept. 1988); Shah v. Eastern 
Silk Industries, Ltd., 493 N.Y.S.2d 150 (App. Div. 1985). 
 172. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp 1044 (N.D. Cal. 
1977). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. For other lower court decisions adopting the Carolina Power position, 
see Daye Nonferrous Metals Co. v. Trafigura Beheer BV, 1997 WL 375680 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting injunctive relief against transfers of funds, in aid of 
arbitration in Paris); Alvenue Shipping v. Delta Petroleum (U.S.A.), Ltd., 876 
F. Supp 482, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting preliminary injunctive relief in aid 
of arbitration in New York Convention signatory); Filantro Spa v. Chilewich 
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U.S. courts have also disagreed over the effect of national leg-
islation on the authority of national courts to grant provisional 
relief in aid of international arbitration. The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has explicitly allowed courts to at-
tach property in international arbitrations.  In Borden Inc. v. 
Meiji Milk Products Co.176, the court held that “entertaining an 
application for a preliminary injunction in aid of arbitration is 
consistent with the court’s power under Chapter 2 of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act.”177  On the other hand, some courts have 
held that court-ordered provisional measures are not available 
under the FAA.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey,178 
held that absent an agreement permitting court-ordered provi-
sional measures, the “unmistakably clear congressional pur-
pose” was to bar such measures.179 
Finally, in the U.S., state arbitration legislation also has an 
impact on interim measures in international arbitration.  The 
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“N.Y.C.P.L.R.”) is par-
ticularly anomalous in the realm of permitting attachments or 
injunctions in international arbitration.  The New York State 
Legislature enacted a provision, now N.Y.C.P.L.R. Section 
7502(c),180 which, on its face, permits provisional remedies in aid 
of arbitration.  Section 7502(c) reads: “[t]he Supreme Court in 
the county in which an arbitration is pending . . . may entertain 
an application for an order of attachment or for a preliminary 
injunction in connection with an arbitrable controversy, but 
only upon the ground that the award to which the applicant 
may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without such pro-
visional relief.”181  However, the “wrapper” of the bill, which be-
came N.Y.C.P.L.R. Section 7502(c), contained a notation, in the 
nature of legislative history, that limited the scope of the provi-
  
Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (McCreary is “facially absurd”), 
appeal dismissed, 985 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 176. Borden Inc. v. Meiji Milk Products Co., 919 F.2d 822 (2d Cir 1990). 
 177. Id. at 826. 
 178. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286 
(8th Cir. 1984). 
 179. Id. at 1290. 
 180. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7502(c). 
 181. Id. 
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sion to domestic arbitration.182  The New York Court of Appeals’ 
interpretation of the provision is consistent with the legislative 
history.  However, in N.Y.C.P.L.R. Section 6202,183 the rules 
permit attachments of the assets of persons not residents or 
domiciliaries of New York or not qualified to do business in the 
state.  The rationale is evidently that individuals and corpora-
tions without a presence in New York are those who are likely 
to remove their assets from the state.184  The limitation on the 
scope of Section 7502(c) makes attachments in aid of arbitration 
available only in a special class of cases, those in which domes-
tic defendants are regarded as likely to remove their assets 
from New York.185 
The problem of national court authority to grant interim 
measures in aid of arbitration is clear.  In the U.S. alone, courts 
disagree over the authority granted by international agree-
ments, national legislation, and state legislation.  In addition to 
international agreements, national legislation, and state legis-
lation, consideration also must be given to the specific institu-
tional arbitration rules chosen by the parties.  All too often, in 
the context of interim measures of relief, there is disagreement 
over interpretation of any of these several sources of arbitration 
law.  A solution that would provide a uniform approach to the 
granting and enforcement of interim measures of relief in aid of 
arbitration would solve a clear conflict in international arbitra-
tion law. 
V. APPROACHES TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM 
Effective interim relief in arbitration requires cooperation be-
tween parties subject to arbitration and the courts.  While arbi-
tration is a result of a private contractual agreement and its 
settlement is handled outside of court, the court system fre-
quently becomes involved.  Courts are often involved with arbi-
tration because arbitrators lack the power to enforce orders.  As 
the effectiveness of an interim measure of protection depends, 
in the end, on its enforceability, court support may be needed. 
The critical question is how to best apply interim measures of 
  
 182. See Newman I, supra note 156. 
 183. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 6202. 
 184. See Newman I, supra note 156. 
 185. Id. 
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protection, with their need for enforcement sanctions, to the 
realm of arbitration. 
Jurisdictions apply several approaches to addressing the is-
sue of interim measures in aid of arbitration.  First, some juris-
dictions, most notably England, apply the court subsidiarity 
approach.  In this approach, parties seek to obtain interim 
measures through the arbitral tribunal and look only to the 
courts as a last resort.186  Second, other jurisdictions allow par-
ties the free choice of applying for interim measures of relief 
from either arbitral tribunals or national courts.187  The 
UNCITRAL M.L., as well as states such as Germany and Hong 
Kong, institutes the free choice model.188  Finally, a small num-
ber of states continue to rule that arbitrators are completely 
restricted from granting interim measures.189 
A. Court Subsidiarity Model 
The arbitration law of England presents an original approach 
to addressing the issue of interim measures in aid of arbitra-
tion.  Jan K. Schaefer calls this approach “the court subsidiarity 
model.”190  England passed the 1996 Arbitration Act in an effort 
to make the law on arbitration simpler and clearer, and to pro-
mote arbitration in their country.191  Until the Arbitration Act of 
1996 was passed, arbitration law was a mixture of common law 
and statute, and it was necessary to refer to the Arbitration 
Acts of 1950, 1975, and 1979, as well as a voluminous body of 
case law.192  Instead of adopting the UNCITRAL M.L., which 
  
 186. See infra text accompanying notes 189–219. 
 187. See infra text accompanying notes 220–37. 
 188. See Jan K. Schaefer, New Solutions for Interim Measures of Protection 
in International Commercial Arbitration: English, German, and Hong Kong 
Law Compared, 2.2 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (1998), at 
http://www.ejcl.org/22/art22-2.doc. 
 189. Italy and Greece represent jurisdictions that do not permit arbitral 
tribunals to grant any form of interim relief. 
 190. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 1. 
 191. See David Fraser, Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes 
Under English Law, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1 (1997). 
 192. For background on the Arbitration Act of 1996, see Jonathan Hill, 
Some Private International Law Aspects of the Arbitration Act 1996, 46 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 274 (1997). 
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was significantly different from existing English law, the legis-
lature decided to amend its own law.193 
The new English law adopted a relatively original approach 
with regard to interim measures of protection in arbitration.  
The Arbitration Act of 1996 established a system of court sub-
sidiarity.  The underlying philosophy regards the court as the 
last resort.194  The ability to grant interim relief is first allocated 
to the arbitrator.195  The parties may agree to give the tribunal 
the power to order, on a provisional basis, any relief which it 
could grant in a final award.196  However, if the parties do not so 
agree, then the tribunal has no such power.197  The parties may 
also, subject to the mandatory provisions of the Act, regulate 
the conduct of their arbitration by reference to institutional 
rules.198  The parties have great autonomy under the English 
Arbitration Act; they may agree to allow a tribunal the power to 
grant interim injunctions, but such power will not be vested in a 
tribunal unless the parties so agree.199 
Sections 38 and 39 allow parties the ability to grant the arbi-
trators competence to order interim measures of relief.200  Sec-
tion 38 confers upon the arbitrator the power to preserve evi-
dence, order security for costs, and other general powers.201  Sec-
tion 39 confers upon the arbitral tribunal the power to grant 
provisional orders.202  Section 39 must be read in conjunction 
with Section 48, which contains the remedies an arbitrator can 
grant in an award.  Section 39(1) makes available, upon party 
agreement, the arbitrator’s power to grant, provisionally, any 
remedy that the arbitrator could grant in a final award under 
Section 48.203  Section 66(1) allows parties to seek the aid of 
courts for the enforcement of arbitral orders made under Sec-
  
 193. See Fraser, supra note 191, at 3–4. 
 194. See Schaefer, supra note 186, § 4.1.2.1. 
 195. See David Brynmor Thomas, Interim Relief Pursuant to Institutional 
Rules Under the English Arbitration Act 1996, 13 ARB. INT’L 405 (1997). 
 196. Arbitration Act of 1996 § 39(1), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 155 (1997) [here-
inafter Arbitration Act]. 
 197. Id. § 39(4). 
 198. Id. § 4(3). 
 199. See Thomas, supra note 195. 
 200. Arbitration Act, supra note 196, §§ 38, 39. 
 201. Id. § 38. 
 202. Id. § 39. 
 203. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.1.2.2. 
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tion 38 or 39.204  In the alternative, parties may seek to enforce a 
provisional order through the application of Section 42.  Under 
Section 42, the court may make an order requiring a party to 
comply with a peremptory order of the tribunal.205  However, 
this may only be sought by the tribunal or by a party with the 
tribunal’s permission, unless the parties have agreed that the 
court’s powers under Section 42 will be available.206  Before 
granting court enforcement of the arbitral award, courts are 
required to determine that all possible arbitral forums and 
methods to obtain enforcement have been exhausted.207 
In the court subsidiary approach, the court can only step in to 
grant interim measures under certain preconditions.208  Section 
44 of the Arbitration Act governs “court powers exercisable in 
support of arbitral proceedings.”209  Section 44(5) is the crucial 
provision governing a court’s power to grant interim measures 
in aid of arbitration.210  Section 44(5) provides, “[i]n any case the 
court shall act only if or to the extent that the arbitral tribunal 
and any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the 
parties with power in that regard, has no power or is unable for 
the time being to act effectively.”211  Schaefer has called this sec-
tion the “effectiveness test.”  The test is designed to determine if 
the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim for interim relief.212  
A party may wish to seek an interim measures from a judge for 
reasons of speed or immediate enforceability.  However, as well 
as persuading the judge that it is entitled to the interim meas-
ures, the party will also have to prove, based on Section 44(5), 
that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to make the interim meas-
ures or that it is unable for the time being to act effectively.213 
  
 204. See Thomas, supra note 195, at 407. 
 205. Arbitration Act, supra note 196, § 42. 
 206. See Thomas, supra note 195, at 407. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.1.2.1 
 209. Arbitration Act § 44. 
 210. See ROBERT MERKIN, ARBITRATION ACT 1996, AN ANNOTATED GUIDE 
(1996). 
 211. Arbitration Act, supra note 196, § 44(5). 
 212. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.1.2.1 
 213. See Thomas, supra note 195, at 408. 
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Moreover, in English Arbitration law, ex parte Mareva injunc-
tions214 and Anton Piller orders215 are crucial weapons in the ar-
senal of a claimant.  Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller or-
ders are granted ex parte and only in cases where the party 
seeking the injunction demonstrates urgency.  These measures 
may only be granted by courts, and not arbitrators, even if the 
parties agree to allow arbitrators that power.216  Section 44’s 
exceptions do not apply; parties may apply directly to courts, 
without tribunal approval, and may seek these measures even if 
the arbitral tribunal is not yet constituted.217 
The benefits of the court subsidiary model are clear.  To limit 
court intervention as far as possible serves the needs of arbitra-
tion because court applications can seriously delay and hamper 
private dispute resolution.218  However, in most cases, court in-
volvement is inevitable, especially during the enforcement 
stage.  The English Act takes this into account when it provides 
for a special enforcement mechanism for arbitrator-granted in-
terim relief.219  However, the “effectiveness test” confers upon 
the courts the decision of whether the arbitral tribunal has ju-
risdiction to order interim measures.  Schaefer argues that it is 
the parties who are in the best position to determine if the arbi-
tral tribunal should have the power to order such measures.220  
  
 214. See Adam Johnson, Interim Measures of Protection under the Arbitra-
tion Act 1996, 1 INT. A.L.R. 9–18, 14 (1997).  An ex parte Mareva injunction is 
an order directed to the defendant that prevents him from dealing with his 
assets pending judgment or, in the arbitration context, pending award.  Such 
an injunction is often coupled with an order requiring the defendant to dis-
close information and documents concerning his assets.  Mareva injunctions 
are often urgent, and conducted in an ex parte setting, without notice to the 
defendant. 
 215. See id.  The Anton Piller order is an order issued by a court to preserve 
evidence.  First developed in cases in the intellectual property context, in 
which potential defendants who were given notice of proceedings would often 
seek to prevent the successful prosecution of claims against them by destroy-
ing any offending materials in their possession, an Anton Piller order is a type 
of search and seizure order that requires the applicant or his representatives 
to be given access to the defendants premises to search for and retain in safe-
keeping documents or other materials relevant to the action which might oth-
erwise be destroyed.   
 216. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.1.2.1 
 217. See Johnson, supra note 214, at 14–15. 
 218. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 5.1.1. 
 219. See id. § 4.1.2.1. 
 220. See id. § 5.1.1. 
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Indeed, this new approach, although intended to cut back on 
court involvement and make arbitration simpler and clearer, 
may not accomplish its goals.  The “efficiency test” and “urgency 
test”221 could further stimulate dispute over interpretation and 
therefore be a source of delay and frustration.  The approach is 
not without its drawbacks. 
B. Free Choice Model 
In the free choice model222 of interim relief, a party has the 
choice to apply either to the court or to the arbitral tribunal to 
obtain the measure of protection sought.  There are no restric-
tions imposed on court access and there is no need for a party to 
seek permission from the arbitrator to apply to the court.  The 
UNCITRAL M.L. is an example of a free choice model because 
the M.L. allows access to both arbitral tribunals and courts in 
seeking interim relief.223  The free choice model and the 
UNCITRAL M.L. are designed to provide a maximum degree of 
party autonomy.224  Unlike the court subsidiary model, which 
reserves the court as last resort and gives courts the ultimate 
decision-making power over whether an arbitral tribunal has 
the power to issue interim measures, the free choice model 
leaves the choice to the parties.  The parties are autonomous in 
deciding by agreement the various aspects of their arbitration, 
including whether to seek interim measures of relief from 
courts or the arbitral tribunal. 
In 1998, Germany adopted the UNCITRAL M.L. and accord-
ingly changed its arbitration regime to accept the legitimacy of 
interim orders issued by arbitral tribunals.225  Germany may 
  
 221. Arbitration Act, supra note 196, § 44(4).  The “urgency test” is used to 
determine if an application for interim measures of protection is needed im-
mediately, such as a freezing of bank accounts to prevent asset dispersion, or 
if the remedy is non-urgent, where the speed of the order is not as essential.  
See Schaefer, supra note 188. 
 222. Jan Schaefer calls the German arbitration law the “free-choice” ap-
proach to interim measures of protection.  See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 1. 
 223. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 21, art. 17.  See also BINDER, supra 
note 51. 
 224. See Dr. Klaus Peter Berger, The Implementation of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law in Germany, 13 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 38 (1998) [hereinafter 
Berger I]. 
 225. See Dr. Klaus Peter Berger, Germany adopts the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, 1 INT. A.L.R. 121–26 (1998) [hereinafter Berger II]. 
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have been motivated to pass this new law because, despite the 
country’s economic strength, stability, and modern infrastruc-
ture, the state was an unpopular arbitration venue.226  Germany 
adopted the UNCITRAL M.L. in an attempt to demonstrate 
that the German legal system espouses international standards 
of arbitral law and practice.227  The hope is expressed that a 
modern and easily acceptable framework will attract arbitra-
tion parties to Germany.228  As a result of this change, Germany 
is now a state that follows the free choice model approach to 
interim measures of relief.  Under the old German arbitration 
law, arbitral tribunals were unable to issue interim measures of 
protection.229  Interim orders issued by arbitral tribunals were 
previously regarded as unenforceable awards.230  However, un-
der the modified M.L. regime, interim measures are available 
and not restricted to relief contained in the German Code of 
Civil Procedure.231 
In the German free choice model, the arbitrator may grant in-
terim measures of relief only at the request of a party.232  The 
arbitrator’s ability to grant interim measures is discretionary.233  
The parties may also, under Section 1033, seek interim meas-
ures of relief from the courts.234  The court ordered measures of 
protection are not discretionary — if certain preconditions are 
  
 226. See The New German Law on Arbitration, 9 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION 
REP. 45 (1998).  See also Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.2.1.  For example, 90% 
of all ICC arbitration between 1980 and 1982 were held in Europe; however, 
in only 2.5% of the cases was Germany the chosen forum.  See Bosch, supra 
note 75. 
 227. See Berger I, supra note 224, at 45. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See Berger I, supra note 224, at. 45. In fact, German arbitral tribunals 
may have the power to order Mareva injunction-type remedies which are un-
known to the German Code. 
 232. See Section 1041, German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessord-
nung), 10th Book, Bundesgesetzblatt I (1997) 3324, reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Annex I (Jan Paull-
son ed., 2002), available at http://www.dis-arb.de/materialien/schiedsver- 
fahrensrecht98.html (German version).  For an unofficial translation and 
commentary on the German Arbitration Law, see also The New German Law 
on Arbitration, 9 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 45 (1998). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See German Code § 1033. 
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met, the court has to order the measure.235  This difference gives 
an advantage to non-discretionary, court ordered relief.  The 
policy of free choice is taken seriously because parties can 
choose to opt for the riskier arbitral tribunal granted interim 
measures, or can go through a possibly longer, more expensive 
route of seeking court ordered interim protection.236  Despite the 
difference, the German model tries to make the two choices 
equally as effective through enforcement of the orders by the 
courts.  Section 1041(2) allows the court to permit enforcement 
of interim measures granted by arbitral tribunals.237  In a 
unique solution to cross-border arbitration problems, Section 
1062(2)238 also gives competence to a court to enforce an arbitra-
tor’s interim order, even if the seat of arbitration is outside of 
Germany.239  The German arbitration laws are a very good ex-
ample of an attempt to create a free-choice model approach to 
interim measures of protection. 
For a free choice model to be successful, it is necessary for the 
state, or the national courts, to grant arbitral tribunals wide 
discretion in the types of interim measures that can be granted.  
One problem with the free choice model is that most states are 
reluctant to grant such broad discretion to an arbitral tribunal 
whose decision is typically not subject to review.  Secondly, par-
ties can generally opt out of many provisions, and they may opt 
out and decide that the arbitral tribunal shall not have the 
power to grant interim measures, thus eliminating the free 
choice and limiting the parties’ autonomy. 
  
 235. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.2.2.1. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See German Code § 1041(2). 
 238. The German Code, Section 1062(2) provides: 
If the place of arbitration in the cases referred to in subsection 1,…,is 
not in Germany, competence lies with the Higher Regional Court 
where the party opposing the application has his place of business or 
place of habitual residence, or where assets of that party or the prop-
erty in dispute or affected by the measure is located, failing which the 
Berlin Higher Regional Court shall be competent. 
 239. See Schaefer, supra note 188, § 4.2.2.1. 
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C. No Interim Relief from Arbitrators At All? 
A small number of states, including Argentina240 and Italy,241 
maintain that arbitral tribunals do not have the power to grant 
interim measures of relief.  In these states, interim measures of 
protection are unavailable through the arbitral tribunal and 
may only be obtained through recourse to national courts.  This 
approach is flawed because it denies parties the ability to 
choose whether arbitrators can grant provisional relief, and it 
inevitably forces parties to resort to courts, while the parties’ 
original intentions were clearly to avoid judicial interference 
with their dispute.  
D. Other Approaches 
1. ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure 
The ICC Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure provide 
the business world with a new procedure through which rapid 
action may be taken when certain difficulties arise in the course 
of a contractual relationship.242  Within the framework of arbi-
tration, this procedure allows urgent orders to be issued even 
before the proceedings are instituted.243  Inspired by the French 
Juge des referes,244 the ICC created a set of rules that allow for a 
quick provisional decision on urgent matters, that either party 
must comply with, subject to its right to apply for a review of 
the decision by the arbitral tribunal or state court.245 
The appointment of a Pre-Arbitral Referee is provided for be-
fore the arbitral proceedings are instituted.  Upon application of 
  
 240. Argentine National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (Codigo 
Procesal Civil y commercial de la Nacion), Book VI, tit. I, art. 753, reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Annex I (Jan Paull-
son ed., 2002). 
 241. Italian Code of Civil Procedure (codice civile), Book Four, tit. VIII, Ar-
bitration, as amended by Law n. 25, Jan. 5, 1994, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Annex I, art. 818 (Jan Paullson ed., 
2002). 
 242. See DERAINS, supra note 40, at 435. 
 243. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 28, at 648. 
 244. The name of the procedure means “judge hearing urgent applications.”  
See French Civil Procedural Code, arts. 482–92.  See also FOUCHARD, supra 
note 40, at 728–34, for a discussion about the French refere provision proce-
dure. 
 245. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 28, at 648. 
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a party to an arbitration agreement, the ICC Court of Arbitra-
tion appoints a person to decide on applications for urgent 
measures only.246  This procedure takes place before the arbitral 
tribunal is even composed because the selection of arbitrators 
tends to slow the process down.  The decision of the referee is 
provisional but binding on the parties.  Parties may appeal to 
the competent jurisdiction (either the arbitral tribunal or state 
court) for review of the order, but the order is binding upon the 
parties for a limited period of time.247  It must be stressed that 
the Pre-Arbitral Referee procedure may be resorted to only on 
the basis of a written agreement between the parties.248  The 
agreement to submit to a pre-arbitral referee may be made in 
the relevant contract or at some time thereafter.249 
Unfortunately, not many parties have taken advantage of the 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; thus, there is no clear indica-
tion if this resolution is an effective mechanism for solving the 
problem of interim measures in arbitration.  However, the pro-
cedure appears inadequate for two reasons.  First, the Pre-
Arbitral Rules do not apply unless the parties have specifically 
declared them to be applicable.  In most cases, if the agreement 
has not been made in advance, it is unlikely that disputing par-
ties will agree to an expedited referee procedure.  Second, the 
procedure for appointing a referee may take up to seven days.  
With regard to certain disputes, especially those related to in-
tellectual property, seven days may not be sufficiently expedi-
tious.250 
  
 246. Id. 
 247. See DERAINS, supra note 40, at 435. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Francis Gurry, The Need for Speed, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/ 
events/conferences/1997/october/gurry.html (discussing, in the context of intel-
lectual property, the need for arbitrators to be available on a twenty-four hour 
basis to decide urgent interim measures). 
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2. The WIPO251 Emergency Relief Rules 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) 
drafted a set of Emergency Relief Rules to be used in conjunc-
tion with their own WIPO Arbitration Rules.  In the intellectual 
property context,252 speed is especially important in the resolu-
tion of disputes.253  Similar to the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Pro-
cedure,254 the WIPO Emergency Rules were designed to confront 
the difficulty that exists, before the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal, which is precisely the time at which a party wishes to 
seek interim relief.255  The WIPO approach to the lack of avail-
ability of interim relief, prior to the constitution of an arbitral 
tribunal, is different from the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee ap-
proach in several key respects.256  Most notably, the procedure is 
integrated at the parties’ option, with the conventional arbitra-
tion procedure under the WIPO Arbitration Rules, and uses the 
idea of constituting a standby panel of arbitrators to ensure 
that an emergency arbitrator can be appointed on twenty-four 
hours notice.257  The Emergency Relief Rules do not apply auto-
matically in every case in which parties designate WIPO Arbi-
tration Rules, but instead serves as an optional additional fea-
ture to the WIPO Arbitration Rules.258  Where the Emergency 
Relief Rules provision is included in the arbitration agreement 
and one of the parties initiates an application for emergency 
  
 251. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is an interna-
tional organization dedicated to promoting the use and protection of intellec-
tual property.  Through its work, WIPO plays an important role in enhancing 
the quality and enjoyment of life, as well as creating real wealth for nations.  
With headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, WIPO is one of the 16 specialized 
agencies of the United Nations system of organizations.  It administers 21 
international treaties dealing with different aspects of intellectual property 
protection.  The Organization counts 177 nations as member states.  See 
WIPO, at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo.en/ (last visited June 7, 2003). 
 252. Examples of intellectual property arbitrations could include disputes 
over injunctive relief sought to prevent disclosure of trade secrets, or to pre-
vent the marketing of a product that infringes upon a patent or a trademark.  
 253. See Gurry, supra note 250. 
 254. See discussion supra, Part IV.D.1.  
 255. See David D. Caron, Proposed WIPO Supplementary Emergency In-
terim Relief Rules, at http://www.law.berkely.edu/faculty/ddcaron/Courses/ 
rpid/rp04069.html. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See Gurry, supra note 250. 
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relief, the emergency arbitrator would be appointed from this 
standby committee of arbitrators.259  The standby arbitrator 
committee eliminates the possibility of undue delay by a party 
through the challenge of arbitrator selection.260  Instead, the 
choice of arbitrator in an Emergency Relief application is not up 
to the parties, but up to the WIPO Arbitration Center to select 
an arbitrator from a published list of arbitrators.261  The parties 
still have the right to challenge the appointment of the arbitra-
tor, but this is limited to a period of twenty-four hours after re-
ceiving notice of the appointment.262 
Furthermore, two forms of application may be brought under 
the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules, an ex parte and inter 
partes.263  The ex parte procedure,264 one in which the allegedly 
aggrieved party would seek relief without serving notice or pro-
viding for the participation of the other party, is considered es-
sential for those cases in which there is evidence of bad faith on 
the part of the other party, or an indication that notice would 
entail the risk that vital evidence might be destroyed or other 
irreparable damage done.265  However, an ex parte procedure 
and any order made in it by the emergency arbitrator would not 
be enforceable under the New York Convention.266  The order 
would have contractual status only.267  However, providing 
backbone to the procedure, most attorneys would advise their 
clients to follow the order, even if it is merely backed by con-
tractual status, especially if the order is backed by sanctions of 
liquidated damages in the event of its breach.268  The inter 
partes procedure is more common, where parties exchange no-
tice regarding application of the emergency relief rules and both 
parties are present for the procedure, which is conducted within 
strict and very short time limits.269 
  
 259. Id. 
 260. See Horning, supra note 163. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See Gurry, supra note 250. 
 264. See WIPO Emergency Relief Rules, art. XIII, in COMPARISON OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 18. 
 265. See Gurry, supra note 250. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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The WIPO Emergency Relief Rules represent a new frontier 
in international arbitration.270  Since the rules are relatively 
new, there is no indication of whether this evolution of arbitra-
tion practice and procedure is well adapted to affording parties 
reasonable protection of their rights through the arbitration 
process in emergencies.  Nevertheless, the Emergency Relief 
rules are the most expansive and groundbreaking rules ad-
dressing interim measures in arbitration practice. 
3. The UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration 
At its thirty-second session, in 1999, the UNCITRAL had be-
fore it a note entitled Possible Future Work in the Area of Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration.271  The Commission entrusted 
the work to one of its working groups, which it named the 
Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) (“Group”) and 
decided that enforceability of interim measures of protection 
would be one of the priority items the group would consider.272  
From the thirty-third to thirty-sixth sessions, the Group con-
tinued to work on the issue of the power of a court or arbitral 
tribunal to order interim measures of protection.273  In fact, at 
the thirty-sixth session, the Group considered a draft text for a 
revision of Article 17274 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration.275 
The proposed revision of Article 17 contains very important 
features that define and clarify the arbitral tribunal’s power to 
order interim measures of protection.  M.L. Article 17 is general 
and does not provide parties or arbitral tribunals with any spe-
cific guidance.276  Section (2) of the draft revision of Article 17 
  
 270. See Horning, supra note 163, at 175. 
 271. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL], Report of the Working Group on Arbitration, 37th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/523 (2002) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Working Group Report]. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. UNCITRAL, Arbitration: Interim Measures of Protection, Proposal by 
the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.121 (2002). 
 275. UNCITRAL Working Group Report, supra note 271. 
 276. See UNCITRAL M.L. art. 17.  Article 17 provides: 
Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, 
at the request of a party, order any party to take such interim meas-
ures of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in 
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defines specific powers possessed by the arbitral tribunal.277  
Section (3) sets forth a standard for tribunals to apply when 
making an interim measures determination.278  Section (4) sets 
forth a controversial provision under which tribunals are given 
the power to make interim orders ex parte.279  For a party to pro-
ceed ex parte, that party must demonstrate not only the re-
quirements of Section (3), but also demonstrate that proceeding 
without notice is necessary.  Orders granted under the ex parte 
rules would be provisional, expiring in twenty days, and the 
requesting party would be liable for any costs suffered by the 
party against whom the measure is ordered (in light of final 
disposition on the merits).280  The draft revision of Article 17 
also mandates that the requesting party provide security as a 
precondition to granting the measure and also provide the tri-
bunal with any material change in circumstances on the basis 
on which the party sought the interim measure.281  Finally, the 
draft revision provides that the tribunal may modify or termi-
nate an interim measure at any time.282 
The Group has also considered the issues of interim measures 
granted by courts and the recognition and enforcement of in-
terim measures.283  The Group has done valuable and consider-
able work in the field of arbitration and the revision of M.L. Ar-
ticle 17 is a great step in resolving the problem of interim meas-
ures in international arbitration. 
  
respect of the subject matter of the dispute.  The arbitral tribunal 
may require any party to provide appropriate security in connection 
with such measure. 
 277. UNCITRAL Working Group Report, supra note 271.  Section (2) allows 
tribunals to make orders preserving the status quo, issuing injunctions, pro-
viding security for costs, and preserving evidence relevant to the resolution of 
the dispute.  Id. § (2). 
 278. Id.  Section (3) provides that the tribunal may order interim measures 
when the requesting party has demonstrated that: (a) there is an urgent need 
for the measure; (b) irreparable harm will result if the measure is not ordered, 
and that harm substantially outweighs the harm that will result to the party 
opposing the measure if the measure is granted; and (c) there is a substantial 
possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits of the dispute.  
Id. § (3). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Amendment of the New York Convention 
Although interim measures of protection have been generally 
enforced by most courts, it is necessary for the New York Con-
vention to be amended to include a specific provision mandating 
courts of nations bound by the treaty to also recognize and en-
force interim measures of relief.  Such an amendment would 
resolve conflicts in nations like the U.S., where some courts 
have enforced arbitrator-granted interim measures284 and some 
courts have expressly denied such enforcement.285  Because en-
forcement is one of the most important aspects of a successful 
arbitration, it is necessary to ensure proper enforcement of the 
critical interim measures or provisional remedies granted by 
arbitral tribunals. 
B. Add Mandatory Rules Governing the Granting and Enforce-
ment of Interim Measures of Relief to All Institutional Arbi-
tration Rules 
Because difficulties in interim measures are most often en-
countered at the critical, early stages of the proceedings, before 
the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, it is necessary for all 
arbitration institutions to adopt procedures similar to the ICC 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure or the WIPO Emergency Relief 
Rules, which ameliorate this problem and help ensure the effi-
cacy of arbitration.  Due to the contractual nature of arbitration 
agreements, it may be difficult to enforce these as mandatory 
provisions.  However, it is necessary for institutions to highly 
recommend these procedures and possibly give some benefit to 
this provision being added to the agreement.  In addition, it is 
necessary for practitioners to urge their clients to include these 
vital provisions, which can protect the party’s most valuable 
assets or claims in the arbitration. 
  
 284. See Carolina Power & Light v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 
1977). 
 285. See McCreary Tire & Rubber Co v. CEAT Spa, 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 
1974). 
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C. Adopt the Proposed Revisions of UNCITRAL Model Law Ar-
ticle 17 
The proposed revisions of UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 17 
provide an interesting answer to the dilemma posed by interim 
measures in international arbitration.  The proposed revision 
provides an effective system of arbitrator-ordered, court-
enforced, and court-ordered interim remedies that will aid the 
practice of international arbitration.  The revision includes limi-
tations on the power of tribunals and courts to order and en-
force interim measures, including certain provisions that limit 
the length of time interim measures are effective, provide for 
appeal of interim orders, and limit the ability of a party to ob-
tain interim measures ex parte.  The UNCITRAL should adopt 
this revision to the M.L., as it will provide a solution to a per-
petual problem to the M.L. and to international arbitration 
generally. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although interim measures of protection in arbitration have 
come a long way in recent times and the use of interim meas-
ures has proliferated, it is necessary to continue to refine and 
alter the system to meet the needs of today’s ever-changing 
world of business.  To make arbitrations effective, it is neces-
sary to implement some mechanism that can ensure that in-
terim measures can be appropriately granted and enforced.  
With the aid of national court systems, institutional rules, and 
practicing international lawyers, the state of interim measures 
in arbitration has improved greatly.  Yet there is still room for 
improvement. 
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